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Abstract
This article studies the effects of demographics on the mix of tax rates on labour
and capital. It uses a quantitative general-equilibrium overlapping-generations model
where tax rates are voted without past commitments in every period and characterized
as a Markov equilibrium. In the U.S., the younger voting-age population in 1990
compared to 1965 accounts for the observed decline in the relative capital tax rate
between those two years. A younger population rises the net return to capital, leads
voters to increase their savings, and results in a preference for lower taxes on capital.
Conversely, ageing might increase capital taxation.
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The objective of this paper is to assess the effect of changing demographics on the mix of
capital and labour taxes. Two considerations motivate this study. First, as a political choice,
the tax structure must reflect the voter’s interests in taxing different factors. By affecting
the economy as well as the age profile of voters, demographic changes are likely to alter these
interests. Second, observed sharp changes in the tax mix have coincided with substantial
shifts in the population structure. In the U.S., between 1965 and 1990 there is a marked
reduction in the tax rate on capital relative to the tax rate on labour income at the same
time as the adult population becomes noticeably younger. This paper’s main finding is that
changing demographics were the major driver of the changing tax mix over that period.
The analysis is based on the preferences over tax rates held by voters within a general equilib-
rium overlapping generations model. The economy is represented by the neoclassical model
of capital accumulation, with households who make decisions about savings and labour sup-
ply, and a government that implements fiscal policy. The structure of tax rates on labour and
capital reflect the aggregation of these tax preferences through a political process. I consider
a form of representative democracy where voters of different ages may enjoy different degrees
of influence in the political outcome. In equilibrium the tax mix is the one preferred by the
typical voter of the decisive age group. I adopt the politico-economic equilibrium concept
introduced by Per Krusell, Vincenzo Quadrini and Jose´-Vı´ctor R´ıos-Rull (1997). Households
vote in every period, without commitment to future policy decisions. Tax outcomes are time
consistent and described as a Markov equilibrium.
The model’s parameters, including those of the political influence function, are calibrated to
match U.S. observations assuming the 1990 age structure of the population. I then use the
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calibrated model to analyse the steady-state implications of changing the age structure of
the population to match the 1965 values and the projected 2025 values. Two main findings
emerge. First, the change in demographic structure can account for much of the change in
tax mix between 1965 and 1990. Second, the model predicts a significant increase in taxes
on capital income between now and 2025.
Although the focus of the analysis is quantitative, a simple two-period model is also studied
in order to help articulate the intuition. The age structure of the population influences equi-
librium taxation in two opposing ways. First, it directly shifts the age of the decisive voter.
Since younger individuals rely less on capital than on labour, a younger population will tend
to increase capital taxation through this channel. Second, the structure of population has a
general-equilibrium effect through its impact on factor supplies and prices. Specifically, hold-
ing tax rates constant, as the population becomes younger the return to capital increases,
thereby increasing the savings rate. As a consequence, a given decisive voter will hold more
capital and prefer to tax capital less heavily.
The quantitative analysis finds that the general equilibrium effect dominates the effect of a
change in the age of the decisive voter. One of the reasons for this is that the calibrated
political influence function turns out to attenuate the impact of changes in demographics on
the age of the decisive voter. In sensitivity analysis, I show that the rise in the overall size
of government between 1965 and 1990 and the increased share of government revenues being
allocated to transfers reinforces the increase in the relative tax on capital.
The main contribution of this paper is to analyse the implications of demographic change
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for taxation, using a quantitative life cycle model with a rich demographic structure, and
a voting process that results in time-consistent policies. There is a long literature on the
political economy of factor taxation. Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (1994a,1994b)
and Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik (1994) are early examples based on tractable models
of the economy and the voting process. More recently, Paul Klein, Quadrini and Rı´os-Rull
(2005), like the present paper, study factor taxation in a quantitative model where voting
delivers policies that are time consistent.1 However, by construction, these works cannot
analyse the role of demographic change. Demographic factors have been considered in other
papers with dynamic voting, including Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka and Phillip Swagel (2004)
which addresses a question similar to that of the present paper.2 These works contain sim-
plifications, notably that of two-period lifetimes, which limit their suitability for quantitative
evaluation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section I reports the U.S. facts object of the
analysis. Section II studies a simple model in order to develop an intuitive interpretation.
Section III presents a more general quantitative model, and then section IV defines and dis-
cusses the equilibrium. Section V calibrates a benchmark version of the model and describes
features of the associated equilibrium. Section VI studies the consequences of demographic
changes. The final remarks in Section VII conclude the paper.
1The approach to voting as a Markov equilibrium was espoused in Krusell, Quadrini and R´ıos-Rull (1997)
and applied to quantitative analysis in Krusell and R´ıos-Rull (1999). In a similar vein, Klein and R´ıos-Rull
(2003) and Klein, Krusell and R´ıos-Rull (2008) study optimal policies.
2See also Gregory W. Huffman (1996), Kennet R. Beauchemin (1998), Marco Bassetto (1999), John
Hassler, Jose´-Vicente Rodr´ıguez-Mora, Kjetil Storesletten, and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2003), and Razin, Sadka
and Swagel (2002).
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I. FACTS FOR THE U.S.
In this section I document two facts for the U.S economy. First, between 1965 and 1990, the
tax rate on capital decreased relative to the tax rate on labor. Second, the voting population
became younger between 1965 and 1990, and it is projected to become older between now
and 2025.3
Figure 1 depicts annual values for the ratio of the tax rate on capital income to the tax rate
on labour income between 1965 and 1996. There is a sharp decline in the relative tax rate on
capital throughout the period as the ratio drops from 2.23 in 1965 to 1.35 in 1996. Most of
the reduction takes place in the central years between 1970 and 1983. The tax rate on capital
declines not only in relative terms but also in absolute terms over this period, averaging 0.383
over the period 1965-1970, and 0.326 over the period 1983-1996. The corresponding tax rates
on labor income were 0.174 and 0.237.4
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2 displays the median age at five-year intervals since 1965 of the U.S. population
aged between 20 and 80. The figures after the year 2000 are based on projected fertility and
mortality trends. The median age of the adult population declines steadily from 43.78 in
1965 to 40.74 in 1990 when it shows the first indications of the marked upward trend which
is to follow. The fall in the median age of the adult population until the 1990’s is precisely an
echo effect of the baby-boom ending in the mid 1960’s. The more recent rise shows this echo
3The sources for the figures shown are described in Appendix A.
4Average effective tax rates from aggregate data may be sensitive to measurement choices but the overall
pattern remains always consistent with Figure 1. See further discussion in appendix A.
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effect is dying off after about one generation.5 The projections anticipate a continuation of
this rising trend. The median age of adults will rise from 40.74 in 1990 to 46.42 in 2025,
and to 46.48 in 2050. To appreciate the fine details of these demographic changes, Figure
3 shows the size distribution of age groups in the population for 1965, 1990, and the 2025
projection.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
II. DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE TAX MIX
The evidence thus suggests a positive association between the population age and the weight
of capital taxation in the U.S.6 This section presents the intuition for the connections be-
tween demographics and the tax mix. The argument has two parts. First, the tax outcome
depends on the voters’ relative income, and second, the voters’ relative income may depend
on demographics.
A. Voter’s relative income and the tax mix.
Consider the following simple model. The economy has two periods. The population con-
sists of I types of individuals, indexed by i, with µi denoting the fraction of the population
that is of type i. Individuals are endowed with income in period 1, and the only difference
among individuals is the size of this endowment, which is denoted by yi1. The agent’s income
5In contrast, the median age of total population aged 0-80 rises since 1965 from 27.52 up to 32.08 in 1990,
and further to the present. I have chosen to report the 20+ age group since it is the adult population that
makes relevant economic and political choices.
6Comparable data for twenty one OECD countries over 1960-1995 lend support to the wider relevance
of this link (available from the author upon request). Razin, Sdaka and Swagel (2004) run regressions with
international data and find a significant positive coefficient for the old dependency ratio on the capital tax
rate.
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then can be divided between current consumption ci1 and capital for the second period k
i
2.
Capital depreciates completely within one period. In the second period, the individual works
the unit endowment of labour at the wage rate w2 and earns the rate of return r2 on the
capital invested ki2. The income from capital in the second period is taxed at a rate τ
k and
the income from labour is taxed at rate τ l. The agent can spend the disposable income in
the second period on consumption ci2. An agent’s utility depends only on her lifetime con-
sumption, and is represented by log ci1 + log c
i
2. Firms produce output in the second period
with a Cobb-Douglas production function of labour and capital, with a capital share of 1/2.
There is a government in the second period who uses the tax revenues to fund an amount
of government spending equivalent to a share 1/2 of output. Given a capital share of 1/2
and a government expenditure share of 1/2, the government budget constraint reduces to
τ k + τ l = 1.7 Markets for inputs and output are competitive.
Consider now the determination of total investment, K2, assuming an already determined
tax rate on capital, τ k, and given initial incomes yi1. The individual decision problem for
a typical member of group i consists of the choice of investment that maximises utility
for given factor prices and taxes, subject to the budget constraints ci1 = y
i
1 − ki2 and ci2 =
(1−τ l)w2+(1−τ k)r2ki2. The standard Euler equation ci2 = (1−τ k)r2ci1 describes the optimal
intertemporal allocation of consumption. Individual investment thus is ki2 = (1/2)y
i
1 −
(1/2)((1− τ l)/(1− τ k))(w2/r2). Using the conditions for market clearing K2 =
∑
µiki2, the
factor prices as marginal products w2 = (1/2)k
1/2
2 and r2 = (1/2)k
−1/2
2 , and the government
7The equality of the capital share and the government expenditure share serves to simplify the exposition
but is not essential to the analysis. The results in this section also follow in a more general model where
utility is log c1 + β log c2, with β > 0, the share of government spending is G in the two periods, there are
given initial tax rates τk1 and τ
l
1, and the capital share is α. See Appendix to the working paper.
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constraint 1 = τ k + τ l, it becomes
ki2 =
1
2
yi1 −
1
2
τ k
1− τ kK2. (1)
Aggregating this individual investment over the total population, a relation between the
capital tax rate, aggregate income Y1 =
∑
µiyi1, and aggregate investment emerges:
K2 = s(τ
k)Y1 where s(τ
k) ≡ 1− τ
k
2− τ k , (2)
where s(τ k) is the investment (or savings) rate over total income. Note that s(τ k) is a de-
creasing function of the tax rate on capital.
Consider now the effect of a marginal change in capital taxation on an individual’s utility.
First note that the induced response of individual investment ki2 leaves utility unchanged
since consumption across the two periods will be reallocated optimally (i.e., the envelope
theorem holds). Therefore, all consequences for utility are accounted for by the response of
disposable income and consumption in the second period ci2, for a given value of the indi-
vidual’s investment ki2. Upon using the government constraint τ
k + τ l = 1, consumption in
period 2 can be written as ci2 = τ
kw2 +(1−τ k)r2ki2. There are two channels through which a
change in τ k affects ci2. The first, and direct effect, is to increase after tax labor income and
reduce after tax capital income. The second, and indirect effect, is the general equilibrium
effect, since a change in τ k will impact on the equilibrium values of w2 and r2. Using the
determination of aggregate investment in (2), the equilibrium input prices can be written
as functions of the tax rate as w2 =
1
2
s(τ k)1/2Y
1/2
1 and r2 =
1
2
s(τ k)−1/2Y −1/21 . The general
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equilibrium effect of an increase in τ k is to decrease the savings rate, thereby decreasing w2
and increasing r2.
In order to examine the net tax impact on consumption it will be convenient to define
the absolute value of the proportional change in the investment rate s(τ k) from (2) as
es(τk) = 1/[(1 − τ k)(2 − τ k)]. It measures the sensitivity of the investment rate to the
capital tax rate. With this notation, the effect of a higher τ k on labour income is given by
w2 − w2 12es(τ k)τ k. The first term is the positive direct effect and the second term is the
negative general equilibrium effect, which will eventually dominate when the tax rate and
the elasticity of investment become sufficiently large. On the other hand, the effect of a
higher τ k on capital income is given by −r2ki2 + r2ki2 12es(τ k)(1 − τ k). The first term is the
negative direct effect and the second term is the positive general equilibrium effect. The
negative effect always dominates. The response of capital income is the one that may have
a differential impact across individual types. The negative effect of capital taxation on the
returns to capital matters more for agent with larger investment ki2.
An agent of type i seeking to maximise her utility will choose the tax rate τ k to the point
where the sum of the effects on the two sources of income discussed above becomes zero.
Using the implication of constant factor shares that w2 = r2K2, this condition then reads:
[
1− 1
2
es(τ
k)τ k
]
− k
i
2
K2
[
1− 1
2
es(τ
k)(1− τ k)
]
= 0 (3)
Given that the individual type i chooses the tax rate on capital τ k, an equilibrium satisfies
the condition for the optimal tax choice (3), with the voter’s relative investment ki2/K2
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determined by (1) and (2). Using (1), the marginal value to τ k in (3) can be written more
explicitly as a function of the tax rate on capital and the ratio of individual initial income
to aggregate investment. I denote this function
Ω(τ k, yi1/K2) ≡
[
1− 1
2
es(τ
k)τ k
]
− 1
2
[
yi1
K2
− τ
k
1− τ k
] [
1− 1
2
es(τ
k)(1− τ k)
]
. (4a)
Using (2) to determine aggregate investment, the equilibrium capital tax rate τ k then solves:
Ω
(
τ k,
1
s(τ k)
yi1
Y1
)
= 0. (4b)
The crucial property is that the marginal value to taxing capital represented by the function
Ω is decreasing in its second argument yi1/(s(τ
k)Y1), the voter’s individual income relative to
aggregate income and investment.8 A richer voter saves more and will prefer to tax capital
less. A lower aggregate income leads to smaller aggregate investment, a higher interest rate
follows given the initial tax mix and, as a consequence, the voter invests more and prefers
to tax capital less. More specifically, (4) says that a higher relative income yi1/Y1 leads to a
lower capital tax rate τ k.
B. The role of demographics.
From equation (4), the structure of population can matter for the tax mix only as long as it
affects the decisive voter’s relative income in the first period, yi1/Y1. To see how demograph-
ics impinges on income, the model has to be further specified. First, I extend the model
of production and competitive markets also to the first period. So an individual, instead
of receiving a given income endowment, works the unit endowment of labour the wage rate
8As a reference, when yi1/Y1 = 1 the equilibrium has τ
k
2 = 1/2; with y
i
1/Yt > 1, τ
k
2 < 1/2.
Demographics and the politics of capital taxation 11
w1 and earns the rate of return r1 on his initial endowment of capital k
i
1. Second, in order
to be specific, the population is divided in only two types of individuals, i, old and young,
with group sizes µold and 1 − µold, respectively. The old and young individuals live for the
two periods and will only differ in their initial capital endowment.9 In particular I assume
kold1 > k
young
1 .
The first period income for an individual in group i is yi1 ≡ r1ki1 + w1. Similarly, aggregate
income is Y1 ≡ r1K1 + w1. In equilibrium, factor markets clear so K1 = µoldkold1 + (1 −
µold)kyoung1 , and factor prices equal their marginal products so w1 = (1/2)K
1/2
1 and r1 =
(1/2)K
−1/2
1 . It follows that:
yi1 =
1
2
K
1/2
1
(
ki1
K1
+ 1
)
(5)
and
Y1 = K
1/2
1 (6)
Thus an agent’s initial income is a proportion of per capita output that depends on his
relative endowment of capital.
There are two consequences of a shift to a younger population that results from a decrease
in µold. The first is that the age of the decisive voter may decrease. The second is that initial
aggregate income is decreased relative to individual incomes. I analyse each of these effects in
turn. First, the decisive voter’s type i may change from old to young. The assumption made
that the old type owns initially more capital than the young type implies, by (5) and (6), that
9Although this economy has no explicit age structure, I refer to the two types as old and young since they
are distinguished by their endowment of capital, and in the life-cycle model that I analyze later in the paper,
a key distinguishing feature between old and young individuals will be their accumulated capital stocks.
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the old has a higher initial income too so yold1 > y
young
1 . For a given demographic structure,
µold, a change in the type of the decisive voter from old to young leads to a reduction in the
decisive voter’s relative initial income yi1/Y1 and, along the lines of the previous discussion
of condition (4), causes a rise in the tax rate on capital.
Proposition 1 Suppose the decisive voter’s type i changes from old to young for a given
µold. Then τ k increases.
Second, the consequences of a lower µold for the optimal choice of τ k for a given decisive
voter i, can be characterised in two steps. As the first step, consider the effect of a younger
population on initial incomes yi1 and Y1. Given that k
old
1 > k
young
1 , the initial impact of this
shift is a reduction in the initial aggregate supply of capital and output. The relative income
of each individual relative to the aggregate, yi1/Y1, naturally rises as can be seen from (5)
and (6). As the second step, these changes in disposable incomes affect taxation τ k as in the
discussion of (4) above. The increased decisive voter’s relative initial income, yi1/Y1, reduces
the marginal utility to capital taxation and leads to a lower tax rate.
Proposition 2 Suppose a lower µold for a given decisive voter’s type i. Then τ k decreases.
To visualise the results, it is useful to express (4) as two conditions, one for investment, K2 =
y1s(τ
k), and another for taxation, Ω(τ k, yi1/K2) = 0. They can be represented graphically as
two curves that describe k2 as a function of τ
k. The ‘investment’ curve has clearly a negative
slope. The ‘taxation’ curve will have also a negative slope if, for the sake of argument, an
old decisive voter is assumed. The reason is that this is a situation where, holding aggregate
investment constant, the marginal utility to capital taxation is increasing or, more precisely,
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Ω1(τ
k, yi1/K2) > 0.
10 Intuitively, the negative response of the decisive voter’s individual
investment to a higher tax on capital breeds further support to this tax. An equilibrium
is given by the intersection of the two curves. Figure 4 below depicts one such situation.11
Proposition 1 says that the decisive voter turning young means a reduction in the decisive
voter’s initial income yi1 that shifts the taxation curve to the left causing the capital tax
rate to increase. Proposition 2 says that the reduction in the after-tax aggregate income
Y1, which follows from a younger population composition µ
old, shifts the investment curve
downwards and leads to a new equilibrium with a lower capital tax rate. Incidentally, with
the negative slope of the taxation curve, a higher investment results in the end. The possible
rise in the individual decisive voter’s income yi1 would also shift the taxation curve upwards
but, even if it were to fall, the result survives.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Summing up, capital taxation can decline with a younger population as a response to the
induced shift in the initial relative aggregate supply of inputs (see Proposition 2). However,
for this to be case the change in the age of the decisive voter must be small since it tends to
push taxation in the opposite direction (see Proposition 1). This analysis helps intuition but
has limitations. It relies on exogenous assumptions regarding the decisive voter’s endowment
of capital and the change in her age. Besides, the individual labour supply is exogenous and
the economic and political choices are essentially made in a static environment. The rest of
the paper builds a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model in order to study more
rigorously the connection between demographic changes and the tax mix.
10Note that, on the other hand, capital taxation also raises the return to capital through aggregate
investment. This makes the marginal total utility decreasing and renders the tax-mix choice problem well
defined.
11The flatter taxation curve expresses the required second order condition for a maximum, which can be
shown to hold generally.
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III. THE QUANTITATIVE MODEL
The model is the standard general equilibrium neoclassical model of capital accumulation,
with overlapping generations, a government that implements fiscal policy, and a political
constitution that specifies the process through which the fiscal policy parameters are set.
Demographics - Agents live for J periods. Age is denoted by j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}. Let the vector
µ = [µ1, ..., µJ ]
′ ∈ RJ denote the age distribution of the population.
Preferences - Preferences of an agent are defined over life-time consumption and leisure
streams. Denote by cj the consumption of this household and by lj the hours of leisure at
age j. Then preferences are represented by
J∑
j=1
βj[(1− γ) log cj + γ log lj],
where β and γ are positive parameters.
Output technology - Aggregate output is produced by combining labour services H and
capital K inputs into a neoclassical production function F (K,H). Assume the production
function is Cobb-Douglas with α the capital share. This output can be consumed or invested
in capital. The rate of depreciation of capital is δ. The value of the labour services per unit
of time supplied by an individual of cohort j is the product of a fixed age-specific labour
productivity parameter, j, and an index of aggregate labour-augmenting productivity which
grows at a constant proportional rate λ.
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Government (fiscal constitution) - The government collects proportional taxes on capital and
labour income, at rates τl and τk respectively, to fund unproductive government consumption,
and lump-sum transfers to households. The government cannot borrow nor lend. The
balanced budget constraint is:
G+ T = τl
Hw
F (K,H)
+ τk
K(R− δ)
F (K,H)
,
where G is the share of public spending on GDP, T the share of transfers on GDP, w is the
wage per unit of labour services, R is income earned per unit of capital, and H and K are
the aggregate supplies of the labour and capital inputs. The lump-sum amount of transfers
perceived by an individual is independent of age j and is thus determined as the constant
fraction T of output, or F (K,H)× T .
Markets and Ownership - Each agent is endowed with one unit of time per period that
can be divided between leisure and hours of work. Individual agents also own all the as-
sets in the economy; in the first period of life the household starts off with zero wealth.
There is a competitive market for one-period bonds with a return r where agents can freely
borrow and lend. There are competitive markets for inputs where households rent their
labour services and capital to firms at rates w and R. These firms produce output using the
available technology and sell it in a competitive market at a price that is normalised to unity.
Political constitution - The political constitution specifies the set of rules that determine
the policies in place: tax rates, and government consumption and transfers. The output
shares of government consumption, G, and transfers, T , are taken to be fixed and constant.
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Tax rates are instead decided one period in advance. I will consider two alternative regimes
for the determination of next-period tax rates. In one case policies are determined by the
preferences of the typical household of an exogenously specified age. The other rule translates
popular voting into political outcomes, but accounts for different levels of political influence
across age groups of voters. In general, this may reflect the inner details of the political
process leading up from the polls to policy decisions. I represent this idea in a simple way
and define a ’political-influence’ factor, Ij, which may vary with age j, and use it to weight
the size of each cohort, µj, to obtain the distribution of effective votes over cohorts, µ˜j, as
follows:
µ˜j = µj Ij/
J∑
i=1
(µi Ii).
The tax rates are the outcome of pair-wise contests between alternatives. There will be a
decisive voter who is the median voter according to this distribution µ˜. The particular case
where Ij is constant corresponds thus to direct democracy under majority rule. Under either
regime, the age of the decisive voter, which I denote m, will be a real number in the interval
[1, J ] and may therefore differ from any of the integer age groups j ∈ {1, ..., J}. Policy
decisions will appropriately average the preferred choices of the two cohorts j closest to m.12
IV. POLITICO-ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
I use this model to study the determination of policies and macroeoconomic variables. I will
focus on outcomes that arise in equilibria where markets clear, and agents make optimal
choices. I will assume that households have perfect foresight. Under the assumed political
constitution thus next-period endogenous tax rates will reflect the current preferences of ra-
12This will help strike a balance between affordable computational costs – which require the age groups j
to lie relatively far between – and empirical relevance – which must account for relatively modest changes
in the age of the decisive voter.
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tional forward-looking agents. These preferences will take into account the future economic
and political consequences of current policy choices. To make the definition and characterisa-
tion of equilibria manageable, I will follow the practice common in some of the literature on
dynamic voting models by restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy a Markov property
as follows.
If tax rates were to be given exogenously then a competitive equilibrium could be charac-
terised recursively in terms of mappings from the aggregate state of the economy into the
endogenous variables of the model. The state of the economy at a given point in time would
be fully described by the current exogenous tax rates, (τl, τk), and the distribution of indi-
vidual asset wealth over the life cycle, A = [A1, ..., AJ ]
′.13 With endogenous policies, I will
consider equilibria where next-period tax rates only depend on this minimal state as well. In
equilibrium the state (tax rates and the distribution of wealth) will be governed by a Markov
law of motion. Moreover, by virtue of the government budget constraint, the labour tax rate
becomes redundant and the aggregate state can be completely characterised by A and τk.
More formally, I will study situations where policies are governed by a transition function
Ψτ :
τ ′k = Ψ
τ (A, τk).
That is, tomorrow’s capital tax rate depends on today’s state as summarised by the current
distribution of assets across age groups and the value of the tax rate on capital.
In the rest of this section I will first define an equilibrium for a given law of motion of the
13Since all the growing variables will be normalised by aggregate growth, the level of labour-augmenting
productivity can be removed from the list of aggregate states.
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tax rate Ψτ . Then I can obtain the preferences over tax rates by agents in different cohorts
associated with this equilibrium. A political equilibrium is then defined as the Ψτ that,
under the assumed political constitution, is consistent with those tax preferences.
A. Economic equilibrium for given policy transition
An agent’s individual type is characterised by her asset holdings a and age j. Age is impor-
tant since it determines the agent’s planning horizon and labour productivity. Individual
asset holdings at time t by one such agent have been normalised by the level of technology
existing in her first lifetime period t− (j − 1). Households decide on individual asset accu-
mulation and labour supply to the market and these choices will depend on the individual
state (j, a) and the aggregate state (A, τk).
For a given transition for policies Ψτ , a recursive competitive equilibrium can be defined as
a set of age-specific individual value functions and decision functions for asset holdings and
leisure, vj(A, τk, a; Ψ
τ ), ψaj (A, τk, a; Ψ
τ ) and lj(A, τk, a; Ψ
τ ), an aggregate law of motion for
the distribution of wealth, ΨA(A, τk; Ψ
τ ), and an aggregate function for the supply of labour
services, H(A, τk; Ψ
τ ), such that competitive firms and households behave optimaly and all
markets clear.14
B. Equilibrium with endogenous policy transition
The type of political constitution assumed establishes that the next-period tax rate is de-
termined in the current period by the preferences of some cohorts of agents. To derive these
preferences over tax rates, agents think through all the current and future equilibrium con-
sequences of alternative choices of τ ′k. These preferences are defined over τ
′
k’s that will in
14More formal definitions are in an appendix available from the author.
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general differ from the value dictated by the equilibrium law of motion Ψτ (A, τk). These
one-period deviations in the tax rate will be evaluated taking into account their initial effect
on the labour supply and savings decision rules across cohorts, provided that future out-
comes will be those associated with the equilibrium law of motion for policies Ψτ . Denote
by v˜j(A, τk, a, τ
′
k; Ψ
τ ) the utility function of τ ′k that represents these preferences for an agent
of age j = 1, ..., J .
The aggregation of these preferences over tax rates v˜j(...; Ψ
τ ) yields a political outcome.
The particular aggregation rule Γ(A, τk; Ψ
τ ) depends on the prescriptions of the political
constitution. The two regimes that I will explore imply that the outcome reflects the preferred
policy of households associated with a particular age m ∈ [1, J ], using linear interpolation
when m does not coincide with a cohort j ∈ {1, ..., J}. In the first regime this decisive age
is determined exogenously. If m ∈ [j? − 1, j?] is the age of the designated decisive age then
Γ(A, τk; Ψ
τ ) = (j? −m)× arg max
τ ′k
v˜j?−1(A, τk, Aj?−1, τ ′k; Ψ
τ )+
(m− (j? − 1))× arg max
τ ′k
v˜j?(A, τk, Aj? , τ
′
k; Ψ
τ ) (7)
The second regime is democracy under majority voting rule in pair-wise tax rate contests
where the weight of each cohort is given by µ˜j – its demographic size µj adjusted by its
relative political power or influence Ij as defined above in section II. It will be assumed that
individual preferences over taxes are single-peaked so that the median voter theorem applies.
In this case, the policy rule is as above in (7) but with the decisive age m determined in
equilibrium as a function of the state, m(A, τk; Ψ
τ ), which locates the median age based of
the policy preferences, v˜j, and effective political weight, µ˜j, of the different cohorts.
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An equilibrium can be now defined as the policy transition consistent with the choices ex-
pressed through the political process. Formally, it is a fixed point Ψτ of the following
mapping:
Γ(A, τk; Ψ
τ ) = Ψτ (A, τk) (8)
I will focus on steady states, which adds the requirement that the system be consistent with
a constant τk and a stationary distribution of wealth A:
A = ΨA(A, τk; Ψ
τ )
τk = Ψ
τ (A, τk)
(9)
C. Computation and representation of equilibrium
This equilibrium involves fixed points of laws of motion of entire distributions. As in Krusell
and R´ıos-Rull et al. (1999), the solution will be approximated by linear aggregate and indi-
vidual policy functions. This is achieved by computing the equilibrium for a linear-quadratic
version of the model around the steady state.15 Then iterations on the law of motion for the
tax rate Ψτ can be implemented to solve the equilibrium fixed-point problem.
The main steps of the computation procedure are the following:
1. Choose one decisive voter’s age m. Choose a tax rate τk.
2. For the given τk, solve for the steady state of the original economy to obtain A. Ap-
proximate return functions around the steady state by a quadratic form.
15The choice of leisure for some agents (i.e., those in retirement ages) may be non-interior in which case
it will be locally treated as exogenous.
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3. Choose one linear Ψτ .
4. For the given Ψτ , solve for the ΨA and vj’s by successive approximations to the
(quadratic) value function.
5. Compute one-period deviation tax preferences for the cohorts j−1 and j if m ∈ [j−1, j]
as v˜j−1 and v˜j, and update Ψτ according to (7) and (8). Start over in step 4 until
convergence in Ψτ as in (8).
6. Given Ψτ , solve for the tax rate implied by the steady state A found in step 2 and the
τk assumed in step 1. Update τk and start over in step 2 until convergence in τk as in
(9).
7. Given the steady state, compute one-period deviation tax preferences for all voters
j ∈ {1, ..., J}, and the implied preferred tax rates given A and τk. Verify that m is the
decisive age. Otherwise start over in step 1 with a new guess on m. With an exogenous
m this last step 7 is obviously omitted.
The procedure for finding steady states admits a graphical representation which will prove
helpful to present the quantitative analysis. With some abuse of notation, let Ψτ (τk)(., .) de-
note the function that solves the equilibrium fixed point in (8) for the economy approximated
around the steady state associated with the specific tax rate τk, that is: Γ(., .; Ψ
τ (τk)) =
Ψτ (τk)(., .). Now the policy decision aggregator for the next period tax rate in (7) can be
evaluated at this specific current tax rate as Γ(A(τk), τk; Ψ
τ (τk)), where A(τk) denotes the
wealth distribution in the steady state associated with the tax rate τk. The values returned
by this calculation for alternative τk’s result in a mapping in the tax rate that can be rep-
resented graphically. Note that for each different τk, this evaluation requires solving a new
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fixed-point problem in the function Ψτ (τk).
16 Which particular τk characterises a steady-
state equilibrium? For an exogenously given decisive voter’s age m, an equilibrium is a τk
solving τk = Γ(A(τk), τk; Ψ
τ (τk)). This is a scalar fixed point that can be identified using
this graphical representation of the tax mapping. When the decisive voter is endogenous,
there is one mapping for each possible candidate to decisive age. Any fixed point will be an
equilibrium if the candidate assumed coincides with the decisive vote.
V. CALIBRATION AND BASELINE EQUILIBRIUM
The benchmark model is meant to represent the U.S. economy in 1990. The calibration is
done in two main steps. In the first step, I will assume that the age of the decisive voter, m,
is an exogenous parameter so that the influence profile Ij plays no role. The value of m and
parameters other than those of Ij are set so that the equilibrium matches a number of targets
for economic, demographic and policy variables. In the second step of the calibration, I will
specify a form for Ij and parameterise it so that the equilibrium decisive voter coincides
with the value of m calibrated in the first step. This section will end by describing some
properties of the benchmark equilibrium associated with the calibration.
A. Calibration with exogenous m
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the procedure and results when the decisive age m is regarded as
exogenous. In this first step of the calibration, certain parameters are directly determined
from the choice of targets. The number of cohorts J is set so that one model’s period
corresponds to 5 years, which is consistent with the typical format of demographic data
and, on the other hand, keeps computational costs reasonable.The parameters α, δ, λ, and
16If we had instead a global method for finding the equilibrium that did not rely on local approximations,
then the fixed-point problem for Ψτ would have to be solved only once.
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Table 1. Calibration with exogenous decisive age
parameter value target to match source
J 12 5 years per period
α 0.33 capital share 33% NIPA post WW2
δ 0.341 annual depreciation 8% NIPA and BEA
λ 1.069 productivity growth 1.34% NIPA
G 0.15 gov. consumption/GDP 15% OECD Outlook
 Table 2 age-productivity PSID
µ Table 2 population 1990 U.N. database
β 0.895 investment/output 18% NIPA
γ 0.588 time at work 40% PSID
T 0.07 labour tax 1983-96 24% Section I
m 5.360 capital tax 1983-96 33% Section I
Table 2. U.S. age productivity and 1990 demographic profile
Age 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 5.95 7.91 9.35 10.3 10.9 11.0 10.9 10.5 9.99 8.34 5.77 3.85
µ .110 .126 .129 .118 .103 .081 .067 .062 .062 .058 .046 .036
G are set directly to match average 1965-2000 values for the capital share of GDP, the
growth rate of productivity, the ratio of government consumption expenditures to GDP,
and the depreciation rate. The productivity age profile  matches the age component of
labour productivity estimated from the PSID by Jonathan Heathcote, Kjetil Storesletten and
Giovanni L. Violante (2008) over the period 1967-1995. The age distribution of population,
µ, corresponds to the data displayed in Figure 1 for the U.S. in 1990 as supplied by the U.N.
The remaining four parameters are T , β, γ, and m. They have to be calibrated so that the
equilibrium of the model matches certain targets. These targets are the average fraction of
time worked by individuals estimated from the PSID by Heathcote et al. (2008) over the
period 1967-1995, the average investment-to-output ratio over 1965-1996, an the average tax
rates on capital and labour income over the period 1983-1996 reported in Section I. The
impression from Figure 1 was that over the latter period the tax mix remains relatively
stable after the sharp changes of the preceding period.
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B. Calibration with endogenous m
In the second step of the calibration, I choose the following specification for the age profile
of political influence:
Ij = exp
[
−
(
j − j∗
σ
)2]
, with σ =

σY j < j
∗
σO j ≥ j∗
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}
where j∗, σY , and σO are three positive parameters. One can regard this function as a
(Gaussian) distribution of influence over age groups. In this view the parameter j∗ is the
mode characterising the centredness (i.e., the age of the most politically influential group);
the ratio σO/σY is a measure of asymmetry to the right (i.e., how much mass of influence
corresponds to ages older than the mode j∗ relative to younger ages); the parameter σY
describes the level of dispersion of influence away from the mode. I choose to calibrate j∗,
σY , and, in order to facilitate the interpretation, the ratio σO/σY so that the implied age
of the decisive voter in 1990, which I will denote m1990, coincides with the m calibrated in
the first step of the calibration and, in addition, the resulting influence profile is empirically
plausible.17 To specify the five additional targets associated with this latter requirement, I
use evidence on the age distribution of Congress representatives between 1985 and 1995 and
voting participation by ages in the Presidential elections of 1994 and the Congress elections
of 1992.18 For each of five age groups, I simply construct an index by multiplying the weight
in Congress and the average percentage of electoral participation.19 Table 3 summarises the
17The case j∗ = J and σ = +∞ delivers a flat profile so µ˜ = µ. The decisive age is the population median
age of 4.15, much lower than the 5.36 required in the calibration. Since there are many ways to hit this with
the 3 free parameters of the influence function, I need to discipline the exercise by adding at least two more
targets.
18Empirical work finds that voting outcomes reflect to a large extent the legislators’ personal motivations
over those of their constituencies. See, for example, Stephen D. Levitt (1996), Elisabeth R. Gerber and
Jeffrey B. Lewis (2004), and John Griffin (2008).
19The data used is provided by the Census Bureau, Tables 395 and 405,
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Table 3. Calibration with endogenous decisive age
parameter value targets to match source
j∗ 5.561 - Decisive age m Table 1
σO/σY 2.10 - Influence pattern from weights Census Bureau
σY 1.90 in elections and Congress
Implications for decisive age: m1990 =5.360, m1965 = 5.621, m2025 = 5.823
parameter choices and also reports the implied value of the targeted decisive age m1990, as
well as the implied decisive ages under the population profiles displayed in Figure 3 earlier
corresponding to the years 1965 and 2025, which are denoted m1965 and m2025 respectively.
Figure 5 plots the calibrated influence profile as well as the pattern constructed from the
data. The overall approximation is very close.
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
C. Stationary equilibrium
This benchmark equilibrium implies an annual interest rate close to 7 per cent. Graphically,
the equilibrium tax rate can be viewed as a fixed point of the mapping τ ′k = Γ(A(τk), τk; Ψ
τ (τk)),
defined at the end of section IV, corresponding to the decisive age m. Figure 6 represents
this mapping graphically for the benchmark m and also for two other arbitrary values lying
one year apart. For a given exogenous m, an intersection of the corresponding curve with the
45 degree line is an equilibrium. The crossing associated with m = 5.360 characterizes the
benchmark equilibrium tax rate. For a given m, the steady state is unique and the possibility
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/elections/. Given the data format, I have sorted observa-
tions into the age groups 30-39, 40-49, 50-59- 60-69, and 70+. The corresponding weights in Congress are
0.121, 0.357, 0.307, 0.17, 0.046. The electoral weights are 0.427, 0.548, 0.63, 0.642, 0.654. The resulting
combined indexes have been uniformly re-scaled to facilitate comparison with the influence function to be
calibrated. The differences in voting-participation patterns play a very minor role.
Demographics and the politics of capital taxation 26
of multiplicity will not be an issue in the present analysis. The figure also demonstrates that
the capital tax rate declines with the decisive age, and quite sharply.
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
When m is endogenous, its value must coincide with the age of the median voter calculated
using the weights in µ˜. With the calibrated parameters, this only happens for the benchmark
m. None of the other candidates survives as an equilibrium with endogenous m. More
specifically, in all the cases the preferred capital tax rate by any cohort younger (older) than
the given candidate is higher (lower) than the one supported by this candidate. Therefore
the only decisive age in equilibrium must be the median age calculated on the effective
distribution of votes µ˜ which is precisely the value of m of the benchmark equilibrium.20
Figure 7 depicts the cumulative distribution across age groups of demographic size, µj, and
effective votes, µ˜j, for the specification of Ij presented in Table 3. Comparison of µ and µ˜
shows the role of the political influence profile Ij which is to make the decisive voter with
46.80 years of age (i.e., model’s age 5.36) older than the median age in the voting population
of 40.75 years (i.e., model’s age 4.15).
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
The life cycle - Individuals go through a typical disaving-saving-disaving life cycle, while
their labour supply remains fairly stable over the main age range until they effectively decide
to fully retire at age and 70 (period 11 in the model). Figure 8 displays the individual working
20For some non-decisive ages j the second-order condition fails as the sign of the second derivative of the
indirect utility function with respect to the tax rate is positive. The extremum found is thus a minimum of
the quadratic (parabolic) approximation to the ’true’ utility function over tax rates v˜j(., ., ., τ ′k; .). This is
just indication that the ’true’ utility function is convex around the proposed tax rate. A geometric argument
suffices to establish that if the minimum rate delivered is lower (higher) than the proposed τk then the voter
prefers a higher (lower) tax rate.
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hours and asset holdings over the life cycle in the baseline equilibrium. Individuals in the
middle-age range and above are clearly wealthier than younger groups. The decisive voter
aged 5.36 has a wealth of 1.027, which is very close to the economy’s average of 1.036. This
decisive voter is characterised as a weighted composite of individuals aged 5 and 6, where
the latter owns a wealth of 1.49, clearly in excess of the average. Thus it is plausible that
this will impart an asset-rich bend on the voter’s tax preferences.
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
D. Local dynamics
Around the baseline steady state, one can study the dynamic interaction between the key
variables. In the approximated equilibrium, the law of motion for the distribution of assets
and the capital tax rate is described by the linear mappings between the current and next-
period capital tax rate, τk, and wealth distribution, A:
τ ′k = Ψ
τc + ΨτAA+ Ψτττk
A′ = ΨAc + ΨAAA+ ΨAττk
The values of the entries in these matrices and vectors are shown in Appendix B.21 In order
to illustrate the dynamic interactions between fiscal policy and the economy in the short
run, Figure 9 displays the time path for capital and the tax rate τk following an exogenous
generalized 40 per cent reduction in wealth at the steady state. The main message to retain
is that a reduction in the economy’s capital intensity leads to a decline in capital taxation
21Stability can be established by computing the eigenvalues of this system or simulating the response to
a deviation from the steady state.
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before the economy returns to the steady state. The intuition – discussed in the Appendix
to the working paper – is similar to the one for the long-run effects of demographic factors,
to which now the rest of the paper turns to.
INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section I will study the consequences of variation in the age composition of the pop-
ulation µ. The starting point is the benchmark calibration which assumes the demographic
structure of the U.S. in 1990. The two experiments will consist of finding the stationary
equilibrium for a µ characteristic of the U.S. population back in 1965 and projected for
2025, respectively. The demographic data underlying Figure 3 will be used. In order to
help the interpretation of the results, each experiment is run with a constant decisive age m
as well as with an endogenous decisive age. Table 4 summarizes the main results. For the
population structure corresponding to the year indicated in the first column, the next three
columns show values of the political variables: age of the decisive voter m, and the tax mix
τk and τl. The last four columns display macroeconomic variables including the wage rate
per efficient unit of labor w, the gross rate of return r, and the aggregate supplies of capital
K and labor services H. The 1990 entries in the first row thus represent the benchmark
equilibrium. The rest of rows are for situations where m is either determined endogenously
or held constant at its benchmark value.
A. From 1965 to 1990
I start by comparing the 1990 baseline and the 1965 results. With an endogenous decisive
age, the 1990 tax rate on capital τk of 0.33 is lower than the tax rate of 0.40 implied by
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Table 4. Experiments with µ
µ m τk τl r w K H
1990 5.360 0.330 0.240 0.401 0.450 1.036 3.471
Endogenous m
1965 5.621 0.404 0.217 0.431 0.441 0.997 3.546
2025 5.823 0.662 0.111 0.680 0.384 0.640 3.452
Constant m
1965 5.360 0.655 0.112 0.693 0.382 0.659 3.625
2025 5.360 0.847 -0.006 1.389 0.296 0.297 3.520
the 1965 demographic conditions. As reported in Section I on U.S. data, the capital tax
rate dropped from 0.38 to 0.33 between the periods centered roughly around 1965 and 1990.
These implications are thus comparable to the observed data and suggest that much of the
observed shift in the tax mix could be explained by the age structure of the voting population.
This result expresses the interplay of two forces with contrary sign. One force is that the
decisive age m falls between 1965 and 1990 by about 1.3 years. The decisive voter becoming
younger between 1965 and 1990 would on its own have increased the tax rate on capital. To
see this, consider the experiment with constant exogenous decisive age reported in Table 4.
It shows that holding m constant an even larger decline in τk between the 1965 and 1990
population would obtain. Therefore, there must be another force that explains the net fall
in capital taxation. This second force must necessarily be found in a general equilibrium
effect of a younger population which somehow shifts the political preference in favour of
lower capital taxation, for a given median voter m. Figure 10 represents graphically these
outcomes by showing the benchmark equilibrium tax mapping in 1990, also shown in Figure
6 earlier, and in 1965 for both the constant and the endogenous decisive age. The lower
position of the mapping for 1990 compared to 1965 indicates the fall in the political support
to capital taxation. What explains it?
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INSERT FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE
From the life-cycle profiles in Figure 8, the individuals in the middle-age range are clearly
wealthier than younger groups. Now consider the demographic changes displayed in Figure
3. Relative to 1965, the 1990 population has a larger share of asset-poor young individuals at
the expense of the asset-rich middle-age and older individuals. This has therefore a negative
composition effect on the economy’s capital stock. If the tax mix were held constant, there
would be a reduction in the relative supply of capital, a rise in the rate of return and a sub-
sequent increase in the households’ asset holdings. But the voter becomes more reluctant to
tax capital as a consequence, so the tax mix responds by featuring a reduction in the tax rate
on capital income. In effect, across the steady states in Table 4, the change in demographic
conditions between 1965 and 1990 brings about, alongside the reduction in capital taxation,
a rise in the after-tax rate of return and, consequently, an increase in individual savings and
asset holdings.22 For the decisive voter, the marginal cost to taxing capital has increased
and, as a consequence, the preference for the lower taxation of capital is sustained.
This interpretation is consistent with the analytical findings of Section II. The 1965-1990
demographic transformation corresponds to the shift towards a younger population studied
in Proposition 2. More specifically, the quantitative experiment reported in Table 4 features
the capital-supply reversal noted in the discussion of the graphical representation in Figure
4 there. The fact that households save more causes aggregate capital to ultimately increase
– overturning the initial demographic composition effect – and the (pre-tax) interest rate to
22From the figures in Table 4, with an endogenous voter m, the net return on capital (1 − τk)r increases
from 0.257 to 0.269. The net labour return w(1− τl) decreases from 0.345 to 0.341.
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decline. According to that discussion, the fact that, even with lower pre-tax interest rate, a
lower capital taxation is sustained must rest on the increasing-partial-marginal-utility prop-
erty of the voter’s derived preference over the tax rate on capital: a lower capital tax raises
individual savings and breeds further support for lower capital taxation. The predominantly
positive slope of the equilibrium mappings represented in Figure 10 renders this property for
the present quantitative model. Furthermore, in the analytical model of Section II, this was
necessarily the case if the voter was of the old wealthy type. Correspondingly, in the present
quantitative setting, as discussed in Section V, the decisive age involves agents with wealth
above average.
As for the decline in the decisive age m, Figure 10 and Table 4 show clearly that it mitigates
the scale of the reduction in capital taxation during the period considered. A younger voter,
all else equal, has less capital and is more inclined to taxing capital. This conforms the result
in Proposition 1 for the analytical model. In the present analysis, however, this mechanism
is quantitatively too weak to overturn the decline in the capital tax rate. The relatively
modest variation in m, by an amount equivalent to roughly one year and a third, reflects
that the change in the median age of the population µ, by about three years, is dampened by
the calibrated profile of political influence, I, shown in Figure 5. The reason is that it lends
less weight to the changes in the numbers at age groups towards the tails of the distribution
which are characteristic of the demographic transformation over 1965-1990 shown in Figure
3. As Figure 6 suggests, the tax outcome is highly sensitive to the decisive age, and the fact
that the reduction in m is a mild one is important for the negative response of the tax rate
on capital to obtain.
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B. From 1990 to 2025
I turn now to comparing the 1990 benchmark and the results under the population structure
projected for 2025. With an endogenous decisive age, the 2025 tax rate on capital of 0.66 is
vastly higher than the 0.33 implied by the 1990 population conditions. At the same time, the
decisive age increases by about 2.5 years. Therefore this analysis indicates that the ongoing
ageing process might lead to a shift of taxation towards capital income over the next decades
in spite of the decisive voter becoming older.
Like in the 1965-1990 experiments seen previously, these tax responses rest on the inter-
action of two forces with opposed sign, namely the change in the decisive age m and the
general equilibrium impact of population on factor returns and individual asset holdings. To
understand this, consider again the experiment with an exogenous decisive age. Holding m
constant, the 2025 setting implies a vast rise in the capital tax rate to 0.85, up from the 0.33
of the 1990 benchmark. Thus a marked shift in the preferred tax mix by any decisive age
must be the key to the heavy increase in capital taxation. Partly counteracting this general
equilibrium effect, there is the increase in the decisive age. Figure 11 depicts these changes
by comparing the equilibrium tax mapping in 1990, also shown in Figure 6 earlier, and in
2025 for both an exogenous and an endogenous decisive voter’s age.
INSERT FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE
The general-equilibrium effect takes the form of an increased support by a given median
voter to heavier taxation of capital in 2025 relative to 1990. An intuition can be developed
along the lines of the previous discussion for the 1965-1990 experiment. Consider again the
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life-cycle pattern of individual labour supply and wealth displayed earlier in Figure 8. The
change in the age structure of population between 1990 and 2025 must have a direct impact
on the relative aggregate supply of capital and labour inputs. The rise in the share of the
older asset-rich groups causes, for given policies, an increase in the supply of capital and a
decline in the supply of labour, from which a higher wage rate and lower rate of return follow.
This change in factor prices prompts a stronger support for higher taxes on capital and a
reduction in individual savings. In the end, it leads to a net reduction in aggregate capital
intensity thus overturning the initial demographic composition effect. Again, the type of
increasing-partial-marginal-utility to taxing capital identified in the analysis of Section II
must be at work too. As for the rise in the decisive age, it follows from the sizeable aging
of the population. Quantitatively the effect is relatively mild since the political influence
pattern of Figure 5 lends a modest weight to the shifts composition of the population shown
in Figure 3 for 1990-2025. In the present case, this decisive-age effect is weaker and the
general equilibrium adjustment dictates the increase in capital taxation.23
C. Sensitivity to fiscal settings
This section presents some exercises intended to assess the robustness of the previous results
by modifying some of the maintained quantitative assumptions on fiscal variables.
Government expenditures - In the earlier analysis, government spending G and residual
transfers T were held constant in the 1965-1990 experiment. Here I allow these parameters
to adjust along with the population in order to be consistent with two features in the data:
23The assumption of a constant influence profile over time, while reasonable between 1965-1990, is more
questionable for the succeeding 1990-2025 period. Congress appears to be growing substantially older since
the 1990’s. Raising accordingly the mode of the influence profile j∗ from the benchmark 5.561 up to 5.70
would lead to a 2025 decisive age of 5.963, which is enough to effect a reduction in capital taxation.
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Table 5. Adjusting 1965 fiscal parameters
µ m G T τk τl τk/τl
1990 5.360 0.15 0.070 0.330 0.240 1.375
1965 5.621 0.18 0.006 0.373 0.177 2.107
1965 5.621 0.15 0.070 0.404 0.217 1.862
the fall in the GDP share of government spending from about 18 per cent down to the
baseline 15 per cent between 1965 and 199024; the increase in the share of transfers during
that period, starting from the lower share associated with the 1965 tax rates on labour and
capital of 0.174 and 0.380 reported in Section I earlier. To this effect, I set G = 0.18 and
T = 0.006 in the calculation of the equilibrium under the 1965 demographic structure. Note
that the size of the government total expenditure that is to be funded through income taxes,
G+ T , increases from 0.186 to 0.22 between 1965 and 1990, since transfers grow to a larger
extent than expenditures decline. This picture is consistent with the shifts in expenditure
in the U.S.25
Table 5 shows the tax rates on capital and labour, including the tax ratio τk/τl, for various
assumptions on the population structure µ, the decisive age m, and the exogenous param-
eters for government spending and transfers G and T . The first row reproduces values for
the benchmark 1990 calibration. The corresponding 1965 outcomes under the changed fiscal
parameters are displayed in the second row of Table 5. The tax mix is again more tilted
towards capital taxation in 1965 than in 1990. But with changing government expenditures,
the implications provide an even closer quantitative match to the observed change in the tax
mix. To see this, the third row of Table 5 reproduces again values for the 1965 experiment
with constant fiscal parameters reported earlier in Table 4. Compared with the tax ratio of
24See Penn Tables at http://dc2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/
25In the BEA data base, the ratio of government current expenditures (serie GEXPND) – to be funded
from all sources of revenues – to GDP increased from about 0.24 to 0.32 between 1965 and 1990.
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1.862 in this benchmark 1965 experiment, the realistically smaller government used now for
1965 in the second row of Table 5 implies a larger tax ratio of 2.107, which is closer the ob-
served 2.201 from Section I. In other words, the overall increase in the size of the government
has contributed to the change in the tax mix. This negative connection between government
size and relative capital taxation is precisely a central theme in Klein, Quadrini and Rı´os-
Rull (2005).26 The present exercise indicates that both demographics and government size
can be complementary driving forces for the tax mix. Demographic change is quantitatively
more significant though, accounting for 2/3 of the change in the tax ratio. Note also that
the change in government spending cannot account for the decline in the absolute value of
the tax rate on capital.27
Measured effective tax rates - As indicated in footnote 4, estimated tax rates differ across
different studies. For example, the seminal study of Mendoza et al. (1994) calculates higher
average tax rates than in the updated and extended series used in the present 1990 calibra-
tion. More specifically, for the period 1983-1988 they estimate average tax rates on capital
and income of 0.40 and 0.285 respectively. In order to match these figures as well as the
rest of 1990 targets set out in Table 1, a number of parameters have to be recalibrated:
T = 0.1122, β = 0.913, γ = 0.565. Then the required decisive age becomes m = 5.320 which
calls for new parameters of the influence function. I will consider one minimal departure
from the benchmark calibration which adjusts the mode so j∗ = 5.524. This 1990 setting is
shown in the first row of Table 6. In this setup, the 1965 demographic structure leads to a
26Like in that paper, the sign of this link holds for the two types of government current expenditures,
government consumption and transfers. As an illustration, consider the benchmark 1990 equilibrium with
G = 0.15 and T = 0.07. with the tax ratio τk/τ l = 0.330/0.241 = 1.375. A larger G = 0.17 leads to a lower
tax ratio 0.335/0.268=1.25. A larger T = 0.10 leads to a lower ratio 0.371/0.272=1.360.
27See the change from the second to the third row of Table 5.
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tax rate on capital around 0.45 as shown in the second row of Table 6. These implications
are also consistent with the observed change in the tax mix. Regarding the impact of the
population projection for 2025, the last row of Table 6 reports a further increase similar to
that seen earlier.
Table 6. Alternative 1990 tax-mix
µ m τk τl
1990 5.320 0.400 0.285
1965 5.588 0.452 0.268
2025 5.786 0.674 0.176
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper studies the influence of the age structure of the population on the determination
of capital income taxation through voting. A novel aspect is the use of a model with a rich
demographic structure which can account for the fine details of a population’s age makeup.
Another distinctive feature is that voters express their preferences recurrently without com-
mitment, in a fully rational and forward-looking manner, so that policies are time-consistent.
The analysis for the U.S. demonstrates that the younger voting-age population in 1990 rel-
ative to 1965 can account for much of the large decline in the capital tax rate observed
between these two years. On the other hand, the older voting-age population expected in
2025 is shown to lead to a sharp increase in capital taxation. There is no unequivocal one-way
relation between the population’s age, which determines the age of the pivotal voter, and
the tax outcome. It is true that a younger decisive voter tends to support a higher tax rate
on capital. But the very demographic change that alters the age of the decisive voter also
brings about aggregate equilibrium effects which cause the voter’s saving to increase thereby
shifting the political preferences against taxing capital. The ability to match the 1965-1990
drop in capital taxation rests precisely on the strong economic equilibrium effect. This equi-
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librium effects are intuitive and can be understood with the help of a simple tractable model.
The methods developed in this paper may find fruitful application to the study of other
important fiscal policy variables such as social benefits or the size and composition of public
spending.28 This paper has at least three limitations. First, the analysis focuses on sta-
tionary situations and assumes the demographic profile corresponds to a stable population.
For many policy reforms, understanding the transition is important. Second, it is based on
a useful yet crude reduced-form setting for the political process. Given the sensitivity of
taxes to the pivotal age, more robust conclusions may require a political model with deeper
foundations. Third, this investigation is based on a deliberately simple framework for poli-
cies and the economy. Bringing into consideration consumption taxes, government debt and
international capital mobility, might prove important to understand better the differences in
the tax mix over time and across countries.
28Xavier Mateos-Planas (2008) studies, for example, unfunded Social Security.
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APPENDIX
A. Data for section I
Figure 1 shows estimates of average effective tax rates (AERT’s) in Bosca´ et al. (1999) for the
period 1965-1996 based on the methodology in Enrique G. Mendoza, Razin and Linda L Tesar
(1994). Section I contains the average tax rates based on the data represented in Figure 1.
The methodology for calculating AETR’s relates tax revenues directly to the relevant macroeco-
nomic variables in the national accounts. There are difficulties, both conceptual and practical,
in obtaining precise estimates (for a critical study, see OECD 2000). The initial calculations by
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) have been revised in various studies. The source used in the
present paper extends the series forward. David Carey and Harry Tchilinguirian (2000) propose
alternative criteria. Although the level of tax rates at a particular time may differ across these
studies, they all share the conclusion of Figure 1 of a marked reduction in the relative tax rate on
capital, beginning at least since 1970 and stopping by the early 1990’s. A remaining important
issue is whether this fall is part of an earlier trend. With the numbers in Figure 1, as well as in the
original Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994), it is hard to elucidate a trend between 1965 and 1970.
However, Cara McDaniel (2007), with alternative measurement choices, has calculated series that
extend back to the 1950’s which suggest an ongoing trend. In any case, across all the available
measurement studies, the persistent fall in the absolute value of the capital tax rate is only observed
after 1970.
Figure 2 shows calculations based on the U.N. population database. The observations are provided
at five years intervals. In each of these years, the population is described in terms of the distribution
across 5-year age groups. For the median-age calculations I have used linear interpolation. The
data after 1995 are estimates based on the medium-variant assumptions on the path of fertility used
by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations
Secretariat. These data are available at http : //www.un.org/popin/. Figure 3 is constructed on
the same data used for Figure 2.
B. Computed linear mappings
The linear mappings for the benchmark equilibrium are the following:
ΨAc =

0.000
−0.177
−0.046
0.224
0.609
1.078
1.586
2.070
2.458
2.712
2.398
1.180

, ΨAτ =

0.000
0.220
0.483
0.609
0.606
0.488
0.275
0.015
−0.223
−0.316
−0.206
−0.769

Demographics and the politics of capital taxation 39
ΨAA =
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.938 −0.089 −0.045 −0.008 0.099 −0.013 −0.040 −0.029 −0.017 −0.002 −0.001 0.004
−0.121 1.001 −0.022 0.013 0.123 0.001 −0.032 −0.022 −0.009 0.006 0.003 0.007
−0.121 −0.063 1.039 0.022 0.142 0.006 −0.031 −0.021 −0.007 0.009 0.005 0.009
−0.139 −0.077 −0.024 1.057 0.156 0.005 −0.036 −0.026 −0.010 0.007 0.004 0.008
−0.178 −0.105 −0.046 0.004 1.183 −0.001 −0.047 −0.035 −0.019 0.001 0.000 0.007
−0.232 −0.153 −0.078 −0.017 0.172 0.977 −0.060 −0.048 −0.030 −0.008 −0.005 0.004
−0.236 −0.217 −0.130 −0.046 0.176 −0.017 0.871 −0.060 −0.043 −0.019 −0.011 0.000
−0.240 −0.198 −0.195 −0.093 0.174 −0.019 −0.077 0.812 −0.052 −0.028 −0.016 −0.003
−0.184 −0.163 −0.129 −0.158 0.137 −0.010 −0.061 −0.054 0.718 −0.027 −0.017 −0.005
−0.058 −0.055 −0.056 −0.040 0.009 −0.014 −0.020 −0.018 −0.016 0.509 −0.007 −0.003
−0.129 −0.121 −0.105 −0.090 −0.015 −0.044 −0.048 −0.042 −0.038 −0.032 0.582 −0.010

Ψτc =
[
0.167
]
, Ψττ =
[
0.107
]
ΨτA =
[
0.115 0.077 0.047 0.129 −0.291 −0.050 0.037 0.032 0.027 0.013 0.008 0.001 ]
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Figure 1. The ratio of tax rate on capital to tax rate on labour.
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Figure 2. The median age.
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Figure 5. Calibrated and observed influence profile.
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Figure 6. Equilibrium tax rate solves τk = Γ(A(τk), τk; Ψ
τ (τk)).
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Figure 8. Life-cycle in the benchmark equilibrium.
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Figure 9. Dynamic adjustment to a fall in assets.
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Figure 10. Equilibrium mapping in 1990 and 1965.
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